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Abstract
Economic institutions structure links between labor-market informality and social stratifica-
tion. The present study explores how periods of institutional change and post-socialist mar-
ket transition alter network-based job finding, in particular informal recruitment. We highlight 
how market transitions affect both the prevalence and distribution of network-based recruit-
ment channels: open-market environments reduce informal recruitment’s prevalence but in-
crease its association with high wages. We test these propositions using the case of the former 
East Germany’s market tran sition and a comparison with West Germany’s more stable insti-
tutional environment. Following transition, workers in lower tiers increasingly turned toward 
formal interme diaries, active employee search, and socially “disembedded” matches. Meanwhile, 
employers actively recruited workers into higher-wage positions. Implications for mar ket tran-
sition theory and post-socialist stratification are discussed. 
Personal connections matter for individuals seeking jobs (Granovetter 1995[1974]; Royster 2003), as well as for employers seeking to fill vacant posi tions (Fernan-dez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Marsden 2001). Social-network processes are fun-
damental to understanding the extent to which valued eco nomic resources (i.e., jobs) 
are allocated either through sponsorship or through formal competition. Labor-market 
informality represents a crucial mechanism in the reproduction of inequality by gener-
ating differential access to opportuni ties (Lin 1999). Social networks, and their role in 
labor markets, remain central to sociological analyses of economic activity. However, 
labor-market action is itself embedded in broader economic institutions that variously 
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include markets, central planning, or post-socialist transitional contexts. This study in-
vestigates how market transitions affect the role of personal connections in the labor 
market. It explores how the former East Germany’s reunification with West Germany 
altered the prevalence and distribution of labor-market informality. The East German 
case is an excellent context to explore labor-market change because it offers a natural 
comparison with West Germany.
The extent to which market transitions affect informal job finding remains unclear. 
Market-transition theory, a dominant approach to studying post-socialist contexts, im-
plies that the adoption of market institutions reduces the dominance of patronage in 
economic exchange (Nee 1989; Nee and Matthews 1996). As markets come to coordi-
nate exchange, particularistic criteria become less salient and transactions increasingly 
resemble the “disembedded” action of idealized markets. Yet, recent studies on post-so-
cialist labor markets have found the opposite trend: relative to formal job matches (ob-
tained through advertising and employment agencies, for example), patronage tends 
to persist or increase in the labor market during the transition from socialism to mar-
ket capitalism (Yakubovich and Kozina 2000). Theory also suggests that these kinds 
of trans formations introduce greater meritocracy and reward productivity-enhancing 
skills (human capital) to a greater extent than other stratification mechanisms (Brain-
erd 1998). Support for this proposition is equally suspect: while increas ing wage re-
turns to education have been observed in the wake of some market transitions (Nee 
1996), others have found increasing wage returns to people who use personal contacts 
and patronage resources when finding jobs (Bian and Logan 1996; Angelusz and Tar-
dos 2001; Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001; Gerber and Mayorova 2010).
Our primary contribution is to develop a deeper understanding of the interplay be-
tween institutional dynamics and network-based job matches. While previous research 
analyzes cross-national comparisons of social-capital use (McDonald, Benton, and War-
ner 2012; Son 2013), few studies examine how these patterns change over time and even 
fewer assess variability across periods of institutional change. Our focal research ques-
tions concern (1) how market transitions affect the prevalence of informal job finding; 
as well as (2) how transitions affect infor mal job finding in different positions across 
the wage distribution. We draw on the literatures on market transitions and the role of 
networks in job searching.
We propose a framework that enhances understanding of how economic tran sitions 
alter network-based hiring by extending the conventional formal versus informal di-
chotomy to distinguish how job matches are activated in post-social ist labor markets: 
by employee search or by employer recruitment. Specifically, we highlight a form of 
network-based hiring most affected by transition: infor mal recruitment. Drawing on 
previous research, we clarify how informal recruit ment links the supply and demand 
sides of the labor market under conditions of institutional change. On the supply side, 
these matches occur without an explicit job search on the part of the worker (McDon-
ald 2010). On the demand side, they are facilitated through informal networks on the 
part of employers and their existing employees (Granovetter 1995[1974]; Fernandez and 
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Castilla 2001). Informal recruitment is a network-based job-matching channel linking 
well-connected workers to employers who selectively recruit through informal chan-
nels. We contrast informal recruitment with two other types of job matches: (1) informal 
job search strategies, where workers actively lean on their con tacts for job finding assis-
tance; and (2) formal searches, where job seekers and employers rely on formal interme-
diaries and information sources or direct appli cation. While informal recruitment relies 
on employer activation, these latter types of job matches depend on employee search.
Just as job matches are embedded in interpersonal connections, they are also em-
bedded within broader economic institutions that provide the opportunities and con-
straints governing economic action (Chua 2011; McDonald, Benton, and Warner 2012; 
Son 2013). Post-socialist market transitions affect informal recruitment in two ways: (1) 
its prevalence over time; and (2) its distribution across wage groups. First, market tran-
sitions introduce an unstable institu tional environment, increased competition, uncer-
tainty regarding worker fit, and a changing occupational structure (Gerber and May-
orova 2010). In the short term, uncertainty encourages widespread informality, while 
formal inter mediaries remain underdeveloped. In successful transitions, as in Germany, 
institutions eventually stabilize and formal channels become well established, allowing 
informal recruitment to recede. Second, dismantling central planning opens opportu-
nities for employers to reserve top positions for personal con tacts, but it also exposes 
them to competitive pressures in acquiring the best workers. In this context, employ-
ers have the opportunity and incentive to turn toward recruitment strategies to fill the 
most competitive positions. As a result, a “recruitment paradox” emerges during mar-
ket transition: even as informal recruitment declines overall, it remains relatively im-
portant for filling highly valued occupations.
Drawing on survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), we as-
sess how the transition from socialist to capitalist institutions in East Germany (for-
merly the German Democratic Republic, GDR) during the 1990s altered the mix of in-
formal job matching across the wage distribution. Prior to reunification, East Germany 
featured a constitutional right to work and workers could not easily be dismissed once 
they were hired. Large enterprises dominated the economy and were also the primary 
venue for distributing a variety of wel fare and social entitlements, including housing, 
medical services, and retirement support (Lange and Pugh 1998). Reunification resulted 
in the adoption of the German Economic, Monetary, and Social Union (GEMSU), which 
transferred the West German corporatist social-welfare institutions—including the na-
tional system of social insurance, unions, and employer associations—to the former 
GDR (Goedicke 2006). Authorities also extended West Germany’s financial institutions 
to East Germany through a one-to-one currency exchange and the managed privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises.
GEMSU was distinct from other market transitions in Eastern Europe in that (1) the 
restructuring was externally financed by West German fiscal transfers; (2) it installed 
existing economic institutions (rather than developing new institu tions); and (3) the 
reforms were rapidly instituted through a “shock therapy” approach (Kaser 1998). 
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These features helped avoid the “institutional vacuum” that developed in other tran-
sitions and also helped to establish a strong bureau cratic state that eased market im-
plementation (Hamm, King, and Stuckler 2012). The East German case allows us to ob-
serve changes in labor-market behaviors across periods of rapid transformation and 
into the stabilization of the institu tional environment. Furthermore, we compare those 
changes to West Germany, which maintained a stable institutional structure through-
out the transitional period. Next, we outline our theoretical perspective by exploring 
how economic institutions affect job matches, demand-side informality, and how job-
match patterns are positioned in the wage distribution.
Economic Institutions and Network-Based Job Matches
Market-transition theory dominates the sociological literature on post-socialist strat-
ification but remains contested (Keister and Borelli 2012). It suggests that transitions 
from socialist to capitalist economies alter the stratification regime to favor people with 
market-based resources as opposed to resources in the state redistributive apparatus 
(Nee 1989, 1996; Nee and Cao 1999). Using the case of the Chinese market transition, 
Nee (1989) demonstrated how the emer gence of markets set the context for economic 
actors to earn better income from market-valued resources such as education and en-
trepreneurship, while political patronage lost its income advantages. Increased income 
returns to human capi tal occurred in other transition contexts as well, including Hun-
gary (Rona-Tas 1994), Poland (Domanski and Heyns 1995), and Russia (Brainerd 1998).
Market-transition theory implies that network-based job matches will decline as la-
bor markets develop to coordinate search and match. As competitive mar kets replace 
the patronage logic of the command economy, labor-market matches should come to 
resemble the “disembedded” transactions of idealized markets. Transitions are pre-
sumed to reduce actors’ reliance on the traditional patronage systems that reward so-
cial resources, such as strong familial connections and political connections to the old 
communist bureaucracy, and replace these with market relationships. In this frame, 
markets generate more opportunities for open competition, and formal hiring through 
advertisements, private employ ment agencies, and other formal labor-market interme-
diaries. Thus, markets are thought to reduce the use of particularistic criteria.
Despite these predictions, findings from longitudinal studies of economic transfor-
mation suggest that informal connections continue to play a significant role in the la-
bor market even as socialist economic institutions recede (Gerber and Mayorova 2010; 
Rona-Tas 1994; Yakubovich 2006). For instance, several studies of the Chinese transi-
tion find persistent or increased use of social-capital resources for job finding in both 
the state sector (Li and Walder 2001; Bian, Shu, Logan 2001) and more broadly (Bian 
and Huang 2009; Zhao 2013).
Scholars working in the market-transition framework do not all agree on what accounts 
for these divergent outcomes. Roughly, scholars draw on either new institutionalism or 
corporatism to explore the changing context in transi tion economies (Keister and Borelli 
2012). From the new institutionalist per spective, scholars note that market institutions are 
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often not fully formed or may emerge only unevenly. Formal and informal institutions 
are laws and rules, along with enforcement mechanisms, that structure exchange rela-
tionships, reduce transaction costs, and introduce certainty to economic action (Ingram 
and Clay 2000; North 1990). When these institutions are not fully formed, informal pro-
cesses flourish. Thus, while market-based transactions may feature prominently in well-
established and stable institutional environments, transition contexts typically feature ex-
treme uncertainty and high transaction costs that encourage informality.1
Corporatists working within the market-transition framework have pointed to a va-
riety of alternative features that can mediate the effects of markets. Transition pathways 
vary both within and across countries and are contingent on continuities and discontinu-
ities in political power, state intervention, organizational forms, and historical path de-
pendencies. These determine the kinds of market environ ments that emerge and can al-
ter their implications for stratification and mobil ity. For instance, Walder (1996) argues 
that variable political institutions “define markets” and manage their impacts. Extending 
this insight suggests that changing labor markets are contingent not just on market insti-
tutions themselves but on other institutions that interact with markets, particularly the 
state. Corporatists emphasize the factors that complicate transition contexts and might 
make the for mation of Western-style markets less probable under different conditions.
Despite their distinctive emphases, each of these approaches helps advance our un-
derstanding of how informal labor-market relations are transformed dur ing market 
transitions. The institutionalist approach suggests that labor-market actors turn toward 
social networks during times of institutional uncertainty. The corporatist approach re-
veals how the uneven development of legitimate insti tutional forms is linked to po-
litical power and implementation. These points are particularly relevant for the East 
German case, where external administra tion (from West Germany) and state capacity 
offered a unique benefit. By con trast, Chinese reforms (and others) were internally ad-
ministered and allowed for political cadres to retain sizable power through their so-
cial-capital resources (Li and Walder 2001). Consequently, continuity in political power 
may account for divergent outcomes across different transition contexts.
To these insights, we add another: economic transitions fundamentally trans form 
job-allocation processes in ways that can be understood only by distin guishing between 
supply-side and demand-side informality. In particular, the institutional uncertainty 
and increased competitiveness that accompany these transitions have an especially 
strong impact on how employers use their net work connections to recruit workers.
From Supply-Side to Demand-Side Informality
The distinction between supply- and demand-side informality pivots on identify ing 
who activates job matches: workers or employers. Most of the research on informal 
job finding approaches the issue from the supply side, workers who actively lean on 
their network contacts for information and referrals (see, e.g., Lin 2001; Mouw 2003; for 
counterexamples, see Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2006; Marsden 1994; Yakubov-
ich 2006). In part, this emphasis on supply-side job finding has been due to the relative 
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difficulty in obtaining representative data on employer hiring practices. To overcome 
this problem, some have used indi vidual-level survey data on the activity/passivity 
of job searches in order to infer employer recruitment. For example, research on the 
“non-search” phenomenon in the United States shows that between 25 and 35 per-
cent of currently employed workers found their jobs without engaging in a job search 
(Campbell and Rosenfeld 1985; Granovetter 1995 [1974]; McDonald and Elder 2006). 
Research also indicates that non-searching is more prevalent in Germany than in the 
United States, and these differences are largely consistent with predictions based on 
the unique labor-market institutions across these contexts (McDonald, Benton, and 
Warner 2012). Non-searching has long been viewed as a type of network-based job 
finding because “jobs that ‘fall into your lap’ are unlikely to do so without some per-
sonal intermediary” (Granovetter 1995[1974], 145). Moreover, survey data show that 
the individuals who are most likely to receive unsolicited job leads have the most ex-
pansive networks and highest-status job contacts (Lin and Ao 2008). Consequently, 
non-searching is a useful (if imperfect) indicator of demand-side informal recruitment 
practices, whereby hiring managers and employees use their social connections to re-
cruit workers to fill job openings.
There has been some debate about the extent to which non-searchers were really “not 
looking” for work as opposed to engaging in some form of passive job search, but re-
search reveals that about 83 percent of non-searchers truly had not engaged in any job-
search activities and are almost always connected to new jobs through the receipt of un-
solicited job leads from friends, relatives, and acquain tances (Granovetter 1995[1974]; 
Hanson and Pratt 1991; McDonald 2010). Additionally, there are instances where re-
cruitment of workers can be institution alized in seemingly formal ways, as with the 
use of executive search consultants (“headhunters”) or with institutional linkages be-
tween schools and employers (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1989). However, in-depth in-
vestigations of executive search consultants reveal practices that are highly dependent 
on recommendations and personal networks (Finlay and Coverdill 2007). Similarly, 
school placements are a seemingly institutionalized job-match channel, but these also 
often involve network-based channels on the part of teachers and instructors (Roys-
ter 2003). Consequently, these practices, along with other institutionalized recruitment 
pro cedures, maintain a veneer of formality that masks a more informal foundation.
Differentiating between supply- and demand-side activation is crucial for a thor-
ough understanding of how institutional changes alter the contours of post-socialist 
labor markets. To date, relatively little is known about how informal recruitment and 
active networking might be differentially affected by market transitions. Market-tran-
sition theory implies that, as neoliberal labor-market institutions emerge and become 
legitimated, both supply- and demand-side informal matches should decline in prev-
alence, whereas formal job matches should increase. The shift to capitalist economic 
institutions generates a mar ket for wage labor, increases competition among workers 
for jobs (and among firms for workers), and fosters greater opportunities for matching 
these workers through formal mechanisms (e.g., advertising and employment agencies). 
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However, we argue that the decline in informality should be more dramatic for em-
ployer recruitment than for worker search. In many socialist countries—including East 
Germany (Volker and Flap 1999, 2001), China (Bian 1997), and Russia (Ledeneva 1998)—
job finding via patronage ties and informal networks was widespread because it allowed 
workers and employers to circumvent highly regulated labor-allocation regimes. Among 
these, informal recruitment was an important hiring channel in the patronage networks 
known to thrive under state socialism. In Russia, friends and relatives were an especially 
important channel for finding information about job openings, in many cases without 
an active search (Clarke 1999, 226). The rise of capitalist labor-market institutions should 
reduce this patronage logic, transforming many workers from passive beneficiaries of 
employer patronage into commodified wage laborers actively seeking employment. By 
contrast, the decline in informal search should be less severe. Access to formal job-find-
ing intermediaries is necessarily uneven, and the gaps in access are likely to be filled by 
active informal job searches. Searching for jobs via personal connections has few costs 
and few barriers to access, which is why this form of job finding is frequently associated 
with workers who are on the fringes of the labor market—young people, immigrants, 
and the low skilled (Holzer 1996; Kogan 2011; McDonald and Elder 2006).
Comparative capitalism research indirectly supports these propositions (Esping-An-
dersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001). Informal job searching is fairly prevalent in both 
liberal market economies that involve weaker social-welfare policies and greater mar-
ket-mediated coordination, and in social democratic countries that feature stronger so-
cial-welfare states and more non-market centric coordination (Franzen and Hangartner 
2006; Pellizzari 2010).2 Alternatively, comparative analyses of informal recruitment are 
scarce, but a recent study found that non-searching in the US labor market is signifi-
cantly less prevalent than in Germany (McDonald, Benton, and Warner 2012), which 
is consistent with the notion that capitalist institutions tend to reduce informal recruit-
ment practices by transforming workers into commodified active searchers.
We anticipate that demand-side informality will be quite high immediately following 
the transition from socialism to capitalism. The immediate reliance on employer net-
works stems from the increased competitive pressures, the uncer tain institutional con-
text, and the familiarity of the old patronage job-finding regime (cf. Bunce and Csanadi 
1993; Gerber and Mayorova 2010; Yakubovich and Kozina 2000). Over time, as insti-
tutional uncertainty recedes and market mediation develops, workers should increas-
ingly find work through formal labor-market processes. Thus, we expect that informal 
recruitment will decline rapidly over time, whereas changes in informal job searching 
should be more modest.
Informal Recruitment and the Wage Distribution
In addition to altering the mix of formal/informal job matches, market transi tions also 
affect the stratification order. Transitions typically introduce labor-supply shortages and 
skill mismatches, as the labor pool is ill equipped for the changing industrial structure. 
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Consequently, transitions lead to height ened competition among employers for recruit-
ing highly skilled labor in short supply. In response to these shortages, employer-ac-
tivated matches (informal recruitment) should be increasingly clustered at the upper 
end of the wage distribution.
Several studies offer implicit support for this proposition and the proposed mecha-
nisms. Pellizzari (2010) analyzed how returns to job matching changed in Italy following 
the privatization of recruitment agencies. After privatization, employers faced a height-
ened need to compete for and actively recruit highly skilled labor. In this context, em-
ployers placed a stronger premium on network signals and network-based job finding 
generated greater returns for workers. Similarly, Nee and Opper (2012) find evidence 
of this trend in the Chinese market-reform context. They describe how network-based 
recruitment was important for employers facing changing competitive constraints and 
short ages in highly skilled labor. Employers responded by “developing a diversi fied 
system of formal and personalized recruitment channels” (Nee and Opper 2012, 168). 
The employers they studied filled lower-paid and unskilled techni cal or laborer posi-
tions through formal channels, like listing with employment agencies, posting adver-
tisements, or relying on direct applications. However, employers filled highly skilled/
high-wage positions, especially in management, through network-based recruitment 
(Nee and Opper 2012, 170) In general, these findings suggest that market transitions 
encourage employers to rely on workers’ formal search behavior (i.e., answering ad-
vertisements) to fill lower positions while employers activate job matches for highly 
skilled workers by drawing on their informal connections (i.e., asking acquaintances 
and employ ees to refer candidates).
Additionally, transitions to capitalism may generate greater opportunities for work-
ers to leverage their social connections into economic opportunities (Angelusz and Tar-
dos 2001). Social-network connections are often used in open labor-market environ-
ments to circumvent heightened competition and to serve as signals of the underlying 
quality of job candidates (Erickson 2001; Granovetter 1995[1974]). Previous evidence 
within the United States suggests that relatively privileged workers are more likely to 
find jobs through passive recruitment channels (Campbell and Rosenfeld 1985). In par-
ticular, “elite non-search” (informal recruitment among highly experienced male work-
ers) is espe cially common and the most economically beneficial in the United States; 
these non-searchers receive significant wage returns over similarly positioned work-
ers who find their jobs through active formal searches (McDonald and Elder 2006). By 
contrast, informal job search tends to cluster more among marginalized workers (Loury 
2006) and is not typically associated with higher wages (Bridges and Villemez 1986; 
Mouw 2003; Reingold 1999).
We hypothesize that, whereas informal recruitment is likely to decline in prev alence, 
these practices become increasingly clustered among high-wage workers following tran-
sitions from socialism to capitalism. This possibility has received implicit support from 
previous comparative labor-market research. Informal recruitment (non-search) is sig-
nificantly more prevalent in Germany than in the United States because the generous 
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German welfare state reduces labor-market commodification and thus the propensity to 
actively search (McDonald, Benton, and Warner 2012). In the United States, non-search-
ing is rarer but is associ ated with higher wages and employment in managerial occu-
pations. Notably, this parallels our argument that while informal recruitment may be-
come less prominent as economic institutions liberalize, it increasingly clusters among 
high-wage positions. Rising levels of inequality tend to accompany transitions from 
state socialism to market capitalism (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010; Heyns 2005)—we posit 
that the shift toward informal recruitment of well-connected workers is one mechanism 
driving this growth in inequality. Admittedly, there is a subtle irony to this scenario: 
in addition to the intended goal of promoting merit- and skill-based wage incentives, 
open labor markets might also result in increased rewards for interpersonal sponsor-
ship. Figure 1 summarizes our empirical expectations concerning how the prevalence 
and structural location of informal recruitment changed over the course of the former 
East Germany’s market transition.
We explore how economic transitions influence the prevalence of and wages associ-
ated with network-based job finding, using the example of German reuni fication and 
the transformation of East Germany from a command to a market-based economy.
Figure 1. The recruitment paradox: Empirical expectations for changing prevalence and distribu-
tion to informal recruitment. 
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Data and Methods
We focus on two changes in the German economy with reunification: the chang ing 
prevalence of job-match patterns and how these matches are distributed across occupa-
tions. Therefore, our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we examine how job-match 
patterns changed under the market transition following reunification. Second, we an-
alyze East and West Germany separately to investi gate job-matching patterns across 
the income distribution.
To examine these changes, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), a nationally representative survey that began in 1984 fol lowing 5,921 house-
holds and 12,245 individuals each year, with replacement samples at various time points 
since. Individuals in East Germany were first interviewed in 1990. Consequently, we ex-
amine the labor-market patterns in the years 1991–2001 to examine the labor-market 
patterns in the decade following the 1990 institutional transition. The GSOEP asks re-
spondents how they found their current job, but in our analysis we are interested only 
in how job-match patterns change from year to year—not job matches that occurred in 
earlier years or even before the market transition. Thus, we focused on job changes that 
occurred during the previous year in order to get estimates on contemporaneous wages 
and job characteristics and to assess how these patterns changed over the transition con-
text. We also estimated alternative models that include a selection hazard (inverse Mills 
ratio) to account for potential selection bias on the depen dent variable that excludes re-
spondents who did not experience a recent job change. These models did not yield sub-
stantively different results. We arrange the survey data in a person-period format, where 
respondents contributed an observation for each job match during the study period. We 
exclude respondents who report being self-employed or working for a family business, 
as these types of job matches represent distinct processes from those under consideration.
Under these constraints, we begin with a sample of 8,210 respondents and 11,968 job 
matches. We subsequently listwise delete observations containing missing data on any 
of the variables used in the analysis (removing 2,023 jobs), leaving an analytic sample 
of 6,830 individuals and 9,945 jobs, of which 2,228 individuals and 3,283 jobs were from 
East Germany. Table 1 presents descrip tive statistics for all variables in the analysis for 
both the full sample and the regional samples separately for East and West Germany.
Measures
To analyze the changing prevalence of job-match patterns, we define a categori cal de-
pendent variable that indicates how respondents found their current job. For respon-
dents who declared a job change in the past year, we considered the question “How 
did you get your current job? Did you have to actively look for it or did it just happen?” 
We code respondents who said that it “just happened” as non-searchers, an indicator 
of informal recruitment; that is, matches that are employer activated. Respondents were 
then asked how they found out about their job. Respondents who indicated that they 
actively searched and informa tion came through acquaintances and relatives are coded 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
          Full sample  East Germany            West Germany
         Mean     S.D.              Mean S.D.            Mean S.D.
Dependent variables 
 Formal search (ref.) 0.41 – 0.38 – 0.42 – 
 Informal search 0.18 – 0.21 – 0.17 – 
 Informal recruitment 0.41 – 0.40 – 0.41 –
Independent variables 
 Log adjusted wages 6.95 0.77 6.81 0.67 7.02 0.80 
 Year (1–11) 6.39 3.36 5.96 3.32 6.60 3.36 
 Female 0.49 – 0.46 – 0.51 – 
 Age 32.62 10.46 35.14 11.28 31.39 9.80 
 Vocational training 0.62 – 0.67 – 0.59 – 
 Education 
  Low secondary 0.36 – 0.51 – 0.28 – 
  Upper secondary 0.11 – 0.06 – 0.13 – 
  Tertiary 0.16 – 0.22 – 0.13 – 
 Married 0.49 – 0.57 – 0.45 – 
 Children 0.46 – 0.49 – 0.44 – 
 German nationality 0.86 – 0.99 – 0.79 – 
 Years of work experience 8.53 9.23 11.98 10.53 6.83 7.99 
 Union 0.14 – 0.20 – 0.11 – 
 Part-time 0.22 – 0.15 – 0.26 – 
 Permanent contract 0.66 – 0.61 – 0.68 – 
 Public sector 0.20 – 0.25 – 0.18 – 
 Firm size 2.09 1.03 1.96 0.96 2.16 1.07 
 Occupation 
  Managerial (ref.) 0.03 – 0.03 – 0.02 – 
  Professional/technical 0.25 – 0.24 – 0.25 – 
  Admin support 0.13 – 0.11 – 0.14 – 
  Service 0.08 – 0.06 – 0.09 – 
  Construction 0.20 – 0.24 – 0.18 – 
  Operator/laborer 0.21 – 0.22 – 0.21 – 
  Sales 0.10 – 0.10 – 0.10 – 
 Industry 
  Services (ref.) 0.34 – 0.36 – 0.32 –
  Agriculture  0.02 – 0.03 – 0.01 –
  Energy  0.01 – 0.01 – 0.00 –
  Mining  0.00 – 0.00 – 0.00 – 
  Manufacturing  0.19 – 0.15 – 0.21 –
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as informal searchers, while respondents who indicated using other methods to find their 
job are coded as formal searchers (these include responding to an advertisement, using 
the employment office, direct application, returning to a former employer, and other 
methods). As we are interested in the prevalence and distribution of informal matches 
(both employee and employer activated), formal search served as the reference cate-
gory against which we compare both forms of informal matching.
Although the “just happened” category is an imperfect indicator of employer-acti-
vated job matches, it does capture passive job matches from the perspective of the em-
ployee. We conceptualize these passive job matches as representing employer activa-
tion because they necessarily preclude supply-side search and almost always involve 
network-mediated matching (Hanson and Pratt 1991; McDonald 2010).3  Despite the 
limitations, the measurement offers an excellent generalizable survey item to capture 
the passivity of a job search. We note that while the measurement strategy has been 
validated in the US context, further research is needed to validate the measure in the 
German context.
Independent variables include a variety of individual and job/firm characteris tics 
that may be associated with different types of job matches. Year is a continu ous vari-
able indicating the wave of the survey (1 = 1991 to 11 = 2001). Region (East) is a dummy 
variable indicating (the former) East Germany. To analyze how job-match types vary 
across the wage distribution, we use a continuous variable indicating the log monthly 
real earnings from employment. Earnings are reported as gross employment income 
and are inflation adjusted to the con stant 1997 Euro using the consumer price index 
embedded within the GSOEP data.4 We introduce a dummy variable capturing respon-
dents’ gender (female).Educational attainment is captured in a series of dummy variables 
Table 1. continued
          Full sample  East Germany            West Germany
         Mean     S.D.              Mean S.D.            Mean S.D.
 Industry (cont.)
  Construction  0.16 – 0.20 – 0.14 –
  Trade  0.20 – 0.18 – 0.21 –
  Transport 0.05 – 0.04 – 0.06 –
  Bank, Insurance 0.03 – 0.02 – 0.03 –
 GDP change  4.30 10.55 11.33 10.91 0.84 8.44 
 Unemployment rate 11.30 4.56 16.56 2.98 8.71 2.53
 Foreign sample (West) .14 – .00 – .21 –
 Innovation sample .11 – .07 – .13 –
Observations (jobs) 9,945  3,238 6,662
Individuals 6,830  2,228 4,671
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indicating respondents’ highest education and their educational track: less than second­
ary education served as the reference category, while dummy variables indicate lower 
secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. We also include a separate dummy 
variable for vocational certification. We include dummy variables to control for whether 
or not the respondent was married, had any children under age 16 living in the house-
hold, and reported being of German nationality. Finally, respondents were asked the 
number of years of full-time work experience they hold, which we use as a continuous 
indicator for years of work experience.
We include several occupational and firm characteristics. Union member ship is a 
dummy variable indicating union affiliation. Union membership was measured spo-
radically in the GSOEP, so we used responses to the question in 1993 for the years 
1991–1997, 1998 for the years 1998–1999, and 2000 for 2000–2001. Part­time, public 
sector, and having a permanent contract with the employer were each captured with 
dummy variables. Firm size was included as a continuous variable with 1 =< 20 em-
ployees; 2 = 20–199; 3 = 200–1,999 employees; and 4 ≥ 2,000 employees in the respon-
dent’s place of work. We also construct broad occupational categories using occu-
pation codes from the 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupations. 
Categories included employment in profession/technical, administrative support, service, 
construc tion, operator/laborer, and sales occupations, with managerial occupations serv-
ing as the reference category. The former GDR experienced substantial industrial re-
structuring following unification; therefore, we control for industrial catego ries for 
the respondents’ occupation using the one-digit CNEF (Cross-National Equivalent 
File) industry codes. These industrial categories are specified as dummy variables 
for agriculture, energy, mining, manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, and bank­
ing (services are the reference category).
Finally, we supplement the GSOEP survey responses with information on the Ger-
man federal states (Bundesländer) using geo-coded matching variables. These data 
came from the German Federal Statistical Office’s GENESIS-Online database. We in-
clude measures for change in GDP per capita and the unemploy ment rate in the survey re-
spondents’ federal state. These indicators control for uneven economic development 
across East Germany and the period under study. We also control for relevant sam-
pling-frame indicators.5
Analytic Strategy
To examine changing patterns of job matches, we estimate a series of multino mial 
logistic random-intercept models predicting job-match types across time. A large por-
tion of our sample had only one job match during the study period; because of con-
cerns for sample selection bias due to dropping cases, we use random-effects models 
rather than a fixed-effects approach. This allows us to estimate an error term account-
ing for random individual effects across multiple observations while also permitting us 
to retain single-observation individuals (Petersen 2004). Equation 1 presents the base-
line model used in our analysis. For simplicity, assume only one covariate, xij, for job 
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match i of respondent j. Consider a nominal dependent variable yij with S unordered 
categories and base category r. The model estimates separate intercepts and parame-
ters for each binary comparison with the baseline category: 
ln  
Pr (yij  = s|xij)
  =  β1
 [s]
 + β2 [s]xij + ζj + εij (1)                                               Pr (yij  = r|xij)  
In our case, S has three categories (s) for each type of job match: informal recruit-
ment, informal search, and formal search. Formal search serves as the baseline cate-
gory (r). The coefficients (β) are the log odds ratios for the odds of each outcome ver-
sus the baseline. The model also includes both a level-1 (εij) and a level-2 (ζj) error term 
from the random intercept, where level-1 cases are job matches across time points and 
level-2 cases are individuals.
As we are concerned with the overall patterns of job matching and whether these pat-
terns in East and West Germany converge over the time period, we construct a baseline 
model (table 2, model 1) and a model with an interac tion term (table 2, model 2) that 
assesses whether the effect for time is contin gent on region. We use the reciprocal func-
tion for year with the form 1/year. Reciprocal transformations have a unique feature 
that is substantively relevant for our model: as x becomes infinitely large, y approaches 
an asymptote paral lel to the x-axis. A reciprocal transformation is appropriate when 
theory sug gests that values will approach an asymptote parallel to one or both axes 
(Berry and Feldman 1985, 63). This is substantively useful because we predict that the 
prevalence of the job-matching patterns in East and West Germany will con verge over 
the study period, given the institutional transference from West to East. In particular, 
informal recruitment will decrease but at a decreasing rate. Note, however, that year 
and 1/year are inversely correlated; a positive parame ter estimate for 1/year indicates 
a negative relationship with year. Therefore, the reciprocal transformation for year is 
substantively applicable a priori to account for the nonlinear relationship.6
To study the changing patterns of informal recruitment across the wage distribution, 
we use a product term interacting inflation-adjusted logged wages and the reciprocal 
transformation for year. We estimate models using both region interactions and sep-
arate samples but present separate samples for ease of inter pretations. These models 
describe the prevalence of informal recruitment and informal search strategies (versus 
formal search) across the wage distribution.7
Results
Changing Patterns of Job Matching
How did the transition to market capitalism and the installation of West German institu-
tions change job-matching patterns in the former East Germany? Table 2 presents odds 
ratios from multinomial logistic regression models predicting the type of job match for 
both East and West Germany. 
re c ru i t M e n t, Po s i t i o n, a n D ea s t Ge r M a n Ma r k e t tr a n s i t i o n     919
Table 2. Job Matching in Germany 1991–2001: Odds Ratios from Random Effects Multinomial Lo-
gistic Regression on Job Search Method (n = 9,945)
                                                              Model 1                                     Model 2
 Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit  
                                           vs. formal search   vs. formal search   vs. formal search   vs. formal search
East 1.276 0.994 1.039 0.841
1/year 1.065 1.941*** 0.940 1.778***
1/year * East 2.004* 1.733*
Log adjusted wages 0.880* 0.975 0.897 0.990
Female 0.918 0.970 0.925 0.975
Age 0.990 0.998 0.990 0.998
Vocational training 0.987 1.178* 0.975 1.167*
Education (ref. < secondary) 
     Lower secondary 0.839* 0.885 0.833* 0.880 
     Upper secondary 0.834 0.734** 0.831 0.731** 
     Tertiary 0.869 0.759* 0.836 0.736**
Married 1.243** 1.234** 1.230* 1.224**
Any children 1.074 1.075 1.068 1.070
German nationality 0.787 1.335* 0.785 1.331*
Years of work experience 1.005 1.001 1.004 1.001
Union 1.300** 1.187* 1.300** 1.186*
Part-time 1.019 2.084*** 1.041 2.119***
Permanent contract 1.228** 1.552*** 1.223** 1.547***
Public sector 0.854 0.952 0.850 0.948
Firm size 1.022 0.880*** 1.022 0.879***
Occupation (ref. managerial) 
     Professional/technical 0.608* 0.499*** 0.614* 0.503*** 
     Admin. support 0.606* 0.445*** 0.609* 0.447*** 
     Service 0.787 0.582** 0.794 0.586** 
     Construction 0.796 0.625** 0.803 0.630** 
     Operator/laborer 0.898 0.606** 0.907 0.611** 
     Sales 0.641* 0.593** 0.642* 0.594**
Industry (ref. services) 
     Agriculture 1.150 1.186 1.152 1.188 
     Energy 0.564 0.984 0.565 0.985 
     Mining 2.711 2.063 2.700 2.057 
     Manufacturing 1.134 0.918 1.137 0.919
(Continued) 
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Model 1 estimates the baseline model for the odds of informal searches and non-
searches (the indicator of informal recruitment) relative to formal searches across re-
gion, the reciprocal year transformation, and covariates. Many of the covariates illus-
trate interesting patterns. Informal recruitment is more com mon among vocationally 
certified respondents, union members, permanent contract workers, married respon-
dents, and workers of German nationality. Additionally, informal recruitment is more 
common among part-time workers and workers in smaller firms. Finally, informal re-
cruitment is especially com mon among managerial workers (the reference category). 
This latter effect cor responds to findings in other market and post-socialist contexts (El-
liott 2000; Nee and Opper 2012).
To assess convergence in job-finding patterns across East and West Germany dur-
ing the study period, model 2 includes a product-term interaction between region and 
the reciprocal function for year. The interaction indicates a signifi cantly different ef-
fect of time between the regions for the odds of both infor mal search and non-search 
versus formal search. This indicates that the odds of a given job match being informal 
(either supply- or demand-side activated) changed over time but did so differently in 
East and West Germany.
Figure 2 presents average predicted probabilities from model 2 for each type of job 
match in the former East and West Germany across the time period and aids in inter-
preting these interactions. East German workers increased their like lihood of find-
ing jobs through formal means, while the prevalence of infor mal recruitment declined 
across the study period. Meanwhile, the likelihood of informal searches remained rela-
tively stable across the time period, increas ing only slightly and declining again toward 
the end of the period. In compar ing these patterns, job matches in East Germany came 
to resemble those of West Germany fairly soon after capitalist market reforms and West 
Table 2. continued
                                                              Model 1                                     Model 2
 Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit  
                                           vs. formal search   vs. formal search   vs. formal search   vs. formal search
     Construction 1.330* 0.986 1.340* 0.992 
     Trade 1.145 0.906 1.147 0.907 
     Transport 1.387* 0.994 1.373* 0.986 
     Banking 0.855 1.121 0.856 1.121
GDP change 1.006 1.008** 1.002 1.006
Unemployment 1.005 0.995 1.014 1.002
BIC                                                 20,631.8                                   20,642.8 
LL                                                         –9,970.7                                   –9,967.0
Models control for sampling characteristics listed in Table 1.
*** p < 0.001 ;  ** p < 0.01 ;  * p < 0.05 
re c ru i t M e n t, Po s i t i o n, a n D ea s t Ge r M a n Ma r k e t tr a n s i t i o n     921
German labor-market institutions were installed. The prevalence of non-searches in East 
Germany decreased slightly past West German levels, while the prevalence of formal 
searches increased to match West German patterns. The findings support expected pat-
terns of convergent job-matching channels following institutional transition. As market 
institutions stabilized and uncertainty was reduced, job matches became more formal.
West Germany also saw a decline in informal recruitment matches and a small in-
crease in the formal searches. While the former East Germany faced a sizable shift, West 
Germany’s was more muted. The uncertainty associated with reunification altered the 
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West German labor market in theoretically consistent ways. The West German econ-
omy also experienced substantial shocks following reunification, including an influx 
of workers from the former GDR, inflationary pressures, and large public-sector defi-
cits (Lange and Pugh 1998). During the early part of the decade following reunification, 
both regions saw high levels of non-search and relatively low levels of formal search, 
but these patterns were more extreme in the former GDR. As the decade progressed, 
institutional transi tion stabilized economic activity. As a result of the declining uncer-
tainty, infor mal recruitment matches gave way to more formal searching. A supple-
mentary analysis (not shown) of West Germany before and after reunification supports 
this interpretation: informal recruitment patterns were lower before reunifica tion than 
in the years immediately following reunification, suggesting rapid growth then the de-
cline of informal recruitment in the former West Germany.8
Locating Job-Match Activation within the Wage Distribution
Next, we investigate how these types of labor-market action were situated in the 
wage distribution in East Germany across the transition period. Demand-side match 
activations through informal recruitment should have remained prevalent among high-
wage occupations, as employers increasingly sought to mitigate competition and un-
certainty concerning high-wage/highly skilled posi tions. Meanwhile, informal search 
should not have changed its association with wages. Table 3 presents odds ratios 
from random-intercept models predicting job-match types against covariates and a 
1/year*wages interaction. The table includes models for East and West Germany sep-
arately, along with a signifi cance test using the full sample and an interaction with a 
dummy variable for East Germany. The product term interacting logged wages and 
the reciprocal year transformation estimates the likelihood of a given job match across 
time for different positions in the wage distribution. In East Germany, the interac tion 
term indicates higher probability among high-wage positions of informal recruitment 
relative to formal searching over the transition period. However, the comparable in-
teraction term for informal search did not reach statistical significance, indicating that 
informal searches did not change their clustering in the wage distribution.
Figure 3 presents average predicted probabilities for each job match across the time 
period in East Germany. To interpret the wage*reciprocal-year interaction effect in ta-
ble 3, model 2, we split jobs into high- and low-wage positions—high-wage positions 
are greater than or equal to the mean wage and low-wage posi tions less than the mean. 
We experimented with other cut points, but the results are identical. Figure 3 illustrates 
how changes in the probability of each job-match type were different across the wage 
distribution. In the former East Germany, between 1991 and 2001 the probability of for-
mal searches increased for all wage groups, supporting the analysis presented above. 
However, formal searching increased more among low-wage positions. This suggests 
that low-wage posi tions came to resemble formal market actors more rapidly than oth-
ers. Figure 3 indicates that informal search remained relatively stable throughout the pe-
riod and indistinct across wage groups. Finally, the probability of informal recruitment 
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Table 3. Job Matching in the Former East and West Germany 1991–2001 and Log 
Wages: Odds Ratios from Random Effects Multinomial Logistic Regression on Job-
Search Method
                                              East Germany (n = 3,283)   West Germany (n = 6,662)            Inter.a
 Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit 
 vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal
1/year 11.88 185.5** 0.162 0.179 **
1/year * log adjusted wages 0.674 0.491* 1.317 1.396 **
Log adjusted wages 0.967 1.357* 0.905 0.913 **
Female 1.027 0.935 0.877 0.999
Age 0.981 1.000 0.993 0.996
Vocational training 0.937 1.283 1.025 1.150
Education (ref. < secondary) 
     Lower secondary 0.990 0.934 0.762** 0.844* 
     Upper secondary 0.950 0.736 0.794 0.721** 
     Tertiary 0.820 0.922 0.790 0.663**
Married 1.434* 1.195 1.095 1.200*
Any children 0.879 0.930 1.162 1.127
German nationality 0.243* 1.013 0.865 1.380***
Years of work experience 1.017 1.001 0.998 1.001
Union 1.280 1.077 1.218 1.256*
Part-time 0.801 1.589** 1.206 2.410*** *
Permanent contract 1.755*** 1.623*** 0.948 1.438*** ***
Public sector 0.599** 0.703** 1.105 1.122 ** **
Firm size 1.055 0.892* 1.002 0.872***
Occupation (ref. managerial)
     Professional/technical 0.553 0.664 0.678 0.419***
     Admin. support 0.512 0.548 0.699 0.388***
     Service 0.675 0.759 0.901 0.487**
     Construction 0.628 0.826 0.926 0.517**
(Continued) 
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(employer-activated matches) declined precipitously among low-wage positions but 
declined only slowly among high-wage positions. These findings indicate that employ-
ers continued to rely on recruitment channels to fill high-wage positions but turned to 
formal channels and employee-driven searches to fill lower-wage positions. General 
uncertainties and labor shortages encouraged employers to fill high-status positions 
through recruitment-based channels. It may be that in the long run, after the initial re-
unification shocks, the association between wages and job-match type will disappear. 
However, comparative research suggests that further market liberalization could en-
trench this clustering (McDonald, Benton, and Warner 2012)—liberal market institutions 
could open up opportunities for employers to reserve top positions for well-connected 
employees and create a con text where network recruitment becomes a salient mecha-
nism in generating wage inequality. Future research should consider these alternatives.
Table 3. continued
                                             East Germany (n = 3,283)   West Germany (n = 6,662)            Inter.a
 Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit Inf. search Inf. recruit 
 vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal vs. formal
     Operator/laborer 0.519* 0.767 1.327 0.535** *
     Sales 0.607 0.728 0.679 0.513**
Industry (ref. services) 
     Agriculture 1.240 1.412 1.314 0.909 
     Energy 0.990 2.281 0.354 0.468 * 
     Mining 1.318 1.221 6.175* 3.354 
     Manufacturing 1.195 0.962 1.096 0.891 
     Construction 1.164 0.881 1.426* 1.025 
     Trade 1.040 0.964 1.202 0.882 
     Transportation 1.921* 1.263 1.186 0.893 
     Banking 0.936 1.545 0.849 1.010
GDP change 1.021* 1.025*** 0.998 1.002 * **
Unemployment 1.020 1.009 1.016 0.996
BIC 7,259.1 13,728.3
LL –3,342.1 –6,551.6
Models control for sampling characteristics listed in table 1.
a.The significance for the interaction is obtained with a region dummy interacted with each inde-
pendent variable and indicates whether effects are significantly different across East and West 
Germany
*** p < 0.001 ;  ** p < 0.01 ;  * p < 0.05 
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Discussion and Conclusion
Our study examined the “recruitment paradox” of German reunification. The results 
presented here provide important insights into the ways that institutional change can 
transform network-based hiring behaviors and their associations with economic in-
equality. German reunification introduced market institu tions to the former East Ger-
many and rapidly disassembled central planning. In accordance with new institutional 
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theory, this had the consequence of generat ing heightened economic uncertainty in 
the short term, which subsided under the aid of state support. In the absence of sta-
ble and well-developed formal markets and intermediaries, jobs were filled through 
employer-activated matches (infor mal recruitment). Employers actively sought to fill 
vacancies through network resources as a check on uncertainties emerging from in-
stitutional change. In the long term, as these uncertainties subsided, labor-market par-
ticipants increas ingly turned to formal market mechanisms. By the end of the decade, 
the former East Germany’s levels of formal searching—matches based on active em-
ployee search through formal methods—had converged with West Germany’s. This 
provides support for the notion that stable market institutions prompt greater reliance 
on formal market-mediated transactions.
In addition to producing increased formal market competition, this trend was situ-
ated primarily among low-wage workers. However, high-wage work ers continued to 
be actively sought by recruiting employers at relatively high levels. Thus, while the la-
bor market for low-wage workers came to resemble an idealized “disembedded” mar-
ket, governed by formal transactions, job matches for high-wage workers continued to 
be informal and foster employer searches. Meanwhile, the prevalence and clustering 
of informal searches did not appreciably change over the study period. Labor short-
ages, skill mismatches, and general uncertainty likely provoked employers into seek-
ing to fill high-wage positions through active recruitment, while employees’ active net-
working did not change. This finding mirrors Nee and Opper’s (2012) evidence from 
the Chinese transi tion context, where employers tend to recruit highly skilled workers 
through their network contacts. This shows that market transition altered the preva-
lence and structural positioning of network informality in the labor market and, in par-
ticular, informal recruitment.
However, West Germany also saw labor-market changes due to reunification shocks. 
As in the former East Germany, institutional uncertainty during the early stages of re-
unification encouraged employers to rely on network-based recruit ment immediately 
following reunification as a means of uncertainty reduction. In general, this suggests 
that reunification introduced institutional shocks in East Germany, and to a lesser ex-
tent in West Germany. Actors in both regions turned to network-based recruitment in 
the context of institutional uncertainty. Gerber and Mayorova (2010) observe an anal-
ogous trend in Russia’s economic transi tion. The collapse of Soviet institutions and the 
resulting institutional vacuum encouraged labor-market actors to rely on personal net-
works rather than for mal matches. However, their study notes a uniform turn toward 
network use. Alternatively, our analysis demonstrates a (re)turn toward formality as 
German institutions stabilized by the end of the 1990s. Once market institutions became 
well established, networking and formality patterns across the two regions con verged 
as informal recruitment was replaced by more formal market activity. The corporat-
ist approach to market-transition theory helps explain why the East German transition 
was unique and labor-market patterns differed from other post-socialist contexts. West 
Germany’s “ready-made” institutions (in addition to massive fiscal outlays, political 
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legitimacy, and state capacity) facilitated a more rapid market transition and prevented 
the kind of institutional vacuum that occurred in other post-socialist contexts. In addi-
tion, East Germany’s mar ket transition featured a clean break from the old socialist bu-
reaucratic elite. These differences support corporatist approaches to market-transition 
theory because state capacity and external administration were unique features in the 
German context that may have fostered the eventual decline in informal recruit ment. 
In other transition contexts, such as reform-era China, network resources (particularly 
to political cadres) retained a considerable role (Bian and Huang 2009).
One of the limitations of our study is that we are unable to assess the character of 
individuals’ social networks empirically. However, the extant literature offers some 
clues as to how interpersonal networks change during times of market transition. In 
the GDR’s command economy, informal networks were important for circumventing 
shortages induced by the institutional regime, but the con sequences of discussing pol-
itics with untrustworthy others could be damaging. Volker and Flap (2001) show how 
people responded by forming networks with two separate components. Many people 
discussed politics only within strong-tie networks comprised of trustworthy alters, but 
these ties were distinct from the weaker and uniplex ties that East Germans used to se-
cure goods and services. This distinction started to disappear as reunification began to 
alleviate the short age problem and the political risk of open networks.
On the demand side, these findings also provide insights into the role of employers 
in the changing environment. Market transitions generate a high degree of economic 
uncertainty and dislocation, and East Germany was no exception (Lange and Pugh 
1998). This context provided many employers with both the incentive and the oppor-
tunity to actively recruit workers to fill their best jobs. As in other transition contexts, 
like Russia (Yakubovich 2006), employers in East Germany responded by finding can-
didates for highly paid positions through informal recruitment channels rather than 
reserving the high est-paid jobs for active searchers. As a result, economic uncertainty 
and the open-market environment transformed informal recruitment into a mecha-
nism more concentrated among top employees. However, our study is unable to parse 
out specific employer-recruitment behaviors. Future research should consider how 
market institutions alter the competitive pressures employers face when seeking qual-
ified workers. Are employers more likely to rely on social creden tials when seeking 
highly paid workers under open environments? Would this pattern vary across sec-
tors of the economy? Two recent studies (Chua 2011, 2014) demonstrate that the inter-
play between meritocratic pressures and infor mal job-matching dynamics vary across 
sectors. Chua analyzes social-capital use across public and private sectors of the econ-
omy in Singapore. In the more meritocratic state sector, where formal credentials are 
significantly important, active networking is not particularly impactful (Chua 2011). 
However, despite this apparent meritocracy in the state sector, “unmobilized” social 
capital, such as occurs through an unsolicited contact, is associated with higher wages 
(Chua 2014). Future research might investigate how these sectoral patterns vary dur-
ing institutional transitions. 
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This study has several implications. To begin with, the results offer further illustra-
tion of the dual embeddedness approach to understanding economic behavior (Mc-
Donald, Benton, and Warner 2012). Echoing recent calls for bringing social context into 
the study of networks (Small 2009), this approach highlights how macro-level institu-
tions shape network behavior. These find ings should also be viewed in the context of 
the broader shift to precarity and insecurity (Kalleberg 2009) associated with neolib-
eral reforms. Market-based reforms promote bifurcated labor-market informality, such 
that elite workers enjoy the benefits of passive recruitment while lower-tier workers 
rely on formal intermediaries and “disembedded” job matches. This shift is consistent 
with recent arguments that economic inequality is fueled largely by the generation of 
employment rents for elite workers alongside rent destruction for lower-tier workers 
(Weeden and Grusky 2014). These implications point to the need for further research 
on shifts in employer recruitment strategies and passive job candidates and how these 
reinforce deepening inequality and precarity across institutional contexts.
Notes
1. In the labor market, stabilizing institutions include educational credentialing, labor-market inter-
mediaries, laws, and welfare-state provisions. In their absence, partici pants increasingly rely on 
informal networks to reduce uncertainty (Yakubovich and Kozina 2000).
2. Pellizzari (2010) argues that the prevalence of informal job search in a country is linked to the ef-
ficiency of the intermediaries in place, rather than their mere exis tence. We concur that increases 
in the efficiency of formal search mechanisms should result in a reduction of informal search, yet 
those efficiencies may have an even greater impact on the levels of informal recruitment.
3. Our data reveal that about 40 percent of the job matches in Germany occurred through the informal 
recruitment channel. The GSOEP includes some additional information about passive job-match 
channels, and about 80 percent of the job matches in our “informal recruitment” category were 
purely informal, in that they involved a social tie with a friend or relative. However, job matches 
that “just hap pened” almost always involve some form of employer-activated recruitment because 
they do not involve a supply-side search. Research on the similar “non-search” phe nomenon in 
the United States also supports this proposition (McDonald 2010).
4. The GSOEP retroactively adjusted all income and Consumer Price Index variables for years prior 
to 2001 into euros at the official exchange rate of 1 Euro = 1.95583 DM. We left these as provided 
by the GSOEP.
5. The analytic sample included the GSOEP’s samples A–E, which included the resi dents of the FRG, 
GDR, the oversampled foreigners in the FRG, as well as GSOEP’s 2000 “innovation” supplement 
sample. We controlled for the innovation subsample and the foreigner subsample membership 
using dummy variables.
6. We also conducted several alternative analyses and robustness tests. First, we mod eled the con-
vergence process using a linear effect for time during only the first five years after reunification. 
This model indicated that the job-match patterns in East and West Germany converged through a 
linear process. These results are consistent with what we present and are available upon request. 
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7. A caveat about causal effects is warranted here: while there is a well-known litera ture on the 
casual effects of job matches on wages (Mouw 2003), we are interested in simply the cluster-
ing of job matches across the wage distribution. As such, we avoid counterfactual methods.
8. The non-search question was asked in West Germany beginning in 1989, allowing only a few 
years of comparison. In West Germany, informal recruitment increased substantially from 
1989 to 1991, prior to its precipitous decline following reunifica tion. This pattern is consis-
tent with the expectation that institutional shocks encour aged employers to recruit workers 
at the outset of the transition period but later turned toward formal means.
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